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THE COURSE OF THE BUSINESS DEPRESSION,
THE GROWTH OF UNEMPLOYMENT,
AND THE RELIEF PROBLEM
THE depression was largely responsible for the rapid growth of
interest in the advance planning and cyclical control of public
works. The acute problem of unemployment which it produced
led both to widespread popular demands for the immediate large-
scale expansion of public wOrks programs for the alleviation of
distress and depression, and increased interest in the possible
utilization of controlled public construction as a stabilizing influ-
ence for the prevention of similar occurrences. It is not the pur-
pose of this Appendix to reduplicate the work of many studies
which have described in detail the course of the depression. A
brief survey of the extent of the decline in business, the growth
of unemployment and the magnitude of the relief problem which
it raised may, however, be helpful in indicating the economic
conditions out of which arose these proposals for expanded and
flexible public works for the present mitigation and future pre-
vention of unemployment.
SCOPE AND COURSE OF THE BUSINESS DEPRESSION
The general trend of economic events, 1929—33, is reflected in
the movement of the business indexes presented in Table
The Annalist index of general business activity declined from
105 in 1929 to 64 in 1932, but rose again in 1933 to almost its
level. Wholesale prices fell from 95 in 1929 to 65 in 1932,
and 66 in This general decline in the price level, however,
conceals wide disparities in the movements of the prices of indi-








Bank debits, total ($000,ooo)




New capital issues ($000,000)
10
National income produced il
National income paid out12
Factory employment 13
Factory payrolls 13
o Prepared by the Annolist; combined index of business activity;
computed normal=ioo. Arithmetic average of monthly averages.
2 Federal Reserve Board index; monthly average 1923—25100.
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics index; 3926=100.
'FederalReserve Board value index of contracts awarded in 37
states as recorded by F. W. Dodge Corporation; 6923—25_loo.
o Federal Reserve Board index; 7923—25=300.
6 Compiled by the Federal Reserve Board.
Total deposits of all banks in the United States, exclusive of
amounts due to banks.Compiled June 30 by the Federal Reserve
Board.
TABLE 93
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934
105 87 74 64 72 75
119 96 8i 64 76 79
95 86 73 65 66 75
117 92 63 28 25 32
87 50 37 13 11 12
91 69 67 75
75 56 58 62
481,357 322,366 331,935
217,523 154,401 165,986
51,782 41,963 37,998 41,857
2,298 1,456
15
94 48 63 73
6,909 3,099 1,165 710 1,402
85 66 46
15 15
92 77 6o 57
19
92 77 64 69 79
8g 68 46 49 62
Compiled by the Federal Reserve Board for calendar years;
series discontinued in 6933.
Index prepared by the Standard Statistics Co; 7926v 900.
ao Domestic and foreign capital issues including refunding, com-
piled annually by the Federal Reserve Board.
Index; 6929100. Estimate made by Simon Kuzncts ofthe
National Bureau of Economic Research.
11 Surveyof Current Business,January 7935.
13 U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics index; 1923—25100.
14 Total for iimonths,complete data not having been reported
on account of bank holidays:
3° Data not available.












109COURSE OF DEPRESSION 405
ments in the price structure as the depression progressed.1 The
contraction of production and the fall in prices were paralleled
bysimilar declines inother spheres of business activity—depart-
ment store sales, freight car loadings, construction activity, etc.
Between 1929 and 1932 stock prices fell 75 per cent. After the
abandonment of gold in the spring of some revival occurred.
In 1932 bank debits for the entire country were only about one-
third, and for the cities outside New York, less than one-half their
1929 volume. Bank deposits fell less sharply—between 20 and 25
per cent. The decline is partly explained by the very heavy mor-
tality of banks during this period. New financing was all but wiped
out by the depression, total new issues declining from $io,ooo,ooo-
ooo in 1929 to $i,ooo,ooo,ooo in 1932, and $700,000,000 in 1933
—less than one-tenth their annual volume four years previous.
Such a drastic deflationary movement inevitably caused a great
shrinkage in national wealth and income. The national income
produced in 1932 was less than half its 1929 volume, and national
income paid out only 6o per cent of the corresponding figure for
1929.2 The combined effect of the shrinkage in national income.,
the decline in production and in prices naturally had most serious
repercussions on employment. Between 1929 and 1932 factory
employment declined 40 per cent. Still greater was the drop in
payrolls, the index declining from 109 to 46.
GROWTH OF UNEMPLOYMENT
Perhaps the most serious problem created by the depression
was this rapid decline in employment. In the absence of facilities
in the United States for the collection of adequate data on un-
employment, attempts were made from the first year of the
depression to estimate its volume.
The first figures on unemployment for the entire continental
United States were obtained in conjunction with the decennial
'See F. C. Mills, Bulletinof the National Bureau of Economic Research
(October 31,1933), fora detailed presentation of the behavior of the prices
of different groups of commodities, 1929—33.
2 Estimatesof Simon Kuznets, Bulletin 49 of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, June 7, 1934.406 APPENDIX
census of April 1930.Acount was made of all persons usually
working at a gainful occupation who were not at work the day
preceding the enumerator's call. Jt showed that in, that month
there were slightly more than three million persons of both sexes
involuntarily out of
The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company conducted on De-
cember 8 and 9, 1930asurvey of unemployment conditions among
its industrial policy holders. This canvass covered 46 cities and
included 3.1percent of their total population, or a total of 887,-
ooo adults and children of whom 356,000 were workers. On the
basis of this sample the Metropolitan Life estimated that during
the first week of December 1930therewere between 4,500,000and
5,000,000personswholly unemployed, or about io per cent of
the total number normally in gainful
In the latter half of January 1931theFederal government car-
ried out a census of unemployment in 19cities,the so-called
Woods survey, and found that an increase of 149percent in the
number of persons out of a job, able to work and looking for a
job had occurred since 'April 1930,whenthe decennial census
was taken. On the basis of this sample the number of persons
unemployed in January 1931wasestimated to be 6,050,000.This
estimate assumed that the growth of unemployment in rural areas
had proceeded at the same rate as in the cities. It was estimated
that during the ten months between the two surveys the number
of unemployed for the entire country nearly doubled.
As the depression progressed the number of unemployed con-
tinued to grow. This jncrease can be followed for the most part
only from various sample studies, but these may perhaps be
regarded as broadly indicative of the trend for the entire country.
The tabulation of the results of three surveys conducted in Cm-
3Monthly Labor Review, April 1931.
4Theresults of this survey were reported in detail in the United States
Daily, January 26, 1931,togetherwith a description of the method followed
in arriving at the figure for the entire country. This figure was challenged
as being too low by Miss Frances Perkins, then Industrial Commissioner of
New York State, who estimated that on the basis of the sample taken by
the Metropolitan Life the total number of unemployed should have been
placed at about 7,000,000(NewYork Times, February 6, 1931).COURSE OF DEPRESSION 407
cinnatishows that after eighteen months of depression nearly
40 per cent of those normally in gainful employment in that city
were totally or partly unemployed, the percentage in both cases
having doubled between May '930 and May 1931. In Chicago
on October 15, 1931 approximately 624,000 were estimated to be
unemployed, a number equal to about 40 per cent of Chicago's
gainfully employed workers as reported in the 1930 census.°
Unemployment was also apparently spreading in the rural dis-
tricts but at a less rapid pace than in the larger cities. In June
1931 slightly over 900,000 were reported as unemployed in Penn-
sylvania, or 24.7 per cent of all normally occupied persons as
enumerated in the 1930
A survey conducted by William J. Barrett of the President's
Organization on Unemployment Relief, March 15, 1932, cover-
ing 6,551companies,showed for these concerns, as compared with
1929, a decrease of 27 per cent in employment and of 42 per cent
in payrolls. The relatively much larger decline in payrolls is
explained by the fact that at the date of the survey slightly over
56 per cent of all the employees were working on a part-time
basis.8 A further indication of the growth of unemployment is
afforded by the surveys conducted by F. E. Croxton and F. C.
Croxton in Buffalo, N. Y., which showed a three- to fourfold in-
crease in unemployment between 1929 and A similar tend-
ency is revealed in Philadelphia. Between April 1929 and April
1933 the number of wholly unemployed increased from four to
five times.'°
During the later stages of the depression several further at-
tempts were made to estimate the total number of unemployed
for the entire country. An estimate of the decline of employment
6Monthly Labor Review, July
'MonthlyLabor Review, February 1932; based on the Labor Bulletin of the
Department of Labor, Illinois, November 1931.
Monthly Labor Review, December basedon Special Bulletin No. 33
of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor.
8Monthly Labor Review, August 1932.
eMonthlyLabor Review, February 1933.
10MonthlyLabor Review, June 1933.Basedon a survey by the University
of Pennsylvania.408 APPENDIX
in several leading industries was prepared in 1.933byMeredith
B. Givens on the basis of data provided by the United States
Census and the current information on employment published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These computations show
that industries which had employed 20,953,000personsin '929
wereemploying only 13,574,000 in 1932. Mr. Givens confined
himself to annual data and did not attempt to arrive at a figure
for total unemployment, but he computed an index of employ.
ment for major industrial groups with the monthly average for
1929usedas a base. This index is gi.6 in 1930, declines to
in 1931,to64.5 in 1932, and to for the first four months of
1933.11Similarmethods used by the Cleveland Trust Company
in preparing the monthly estimate of unemployment for the en-
tire country show an increase from 3,000,000inJanuary 1930 to
a peak of nearly 14,000,000 in March 1933anda decline there-
after.12 The most widely used estimates of unemployment, those
of the American Federation of Labor, are presented in Table 94.
TABLE 94
ESTIMATES OF TOTAL NUMBER UNEMPLOYED
IN THE UNITED STATES, MONTHLY, ig3o—StPTEMBER 1934
(inthousands)
MONTH 1930 '93' 1932 1933 2934
January 3,216 7,160 10,197 13,100 11,755
February 3,565 7,345 10,486 13,294 11,443
March 3,543 7,098 10,739 13,689 10,849
April 3,188 6,739 10,990 13,256 10,551
May 3,090 6,750 11,470 12,896 10,248
June 3,250 6,841 11,853 12,204 10,310
July 3,714 7,198 12;300 11,793 10,793
August 4,101 7,357 12,344 10,960 10,821
September 4,150 7,303 11,767 io,to8 10,950
October 4,639 7,778 10,122
November 5,964 8,699 12,008 10,651
December 5,541 8,go8 12,124 10,769
Average 3,947 7,431 11,489 11,904
Source:American Federation of Labor, American Federationist, April and
December 1934
Bulletinq7 of the National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1933.
BusinessBulletin oF the Cleveland Trust Company, January Cf.also
the elaboration of Givens' methods by T. J. Kreps, Estimates of Unemploy.
ment During the Last Four Years, American Statistical Association Journal,
Supplement, March 1934.COURSE OF DEPRESSION 409
These estimates also use as a starting point the United States
Census and arrive at current figures through a combination of
n n nnnr, it-nd4,-nn, n.ni rat-n i-n a,, i.e, ri-n,, r, a ri ran ,r+ p. V ..S aS '.35555 MJS4JS
varioustrades and industries.'3
It is clear from the figures presented that the estimates of total
unemployment vary widely, and hence it is only natural that
their reliability is constantly challenged. Further light on the
unemploymentproblem can be obtained from the activities of
relief agencies during 1933, when the Federal government virtu-
ally took over the relief work of local bodies. In so far as the Civil
Works Administration began to keep adequate statistical records
of its operations, the scope of the unemployment problem during
that year can be better judged. First, however, the development
of relief efforts during the years of the depression preceding 1933
is briefly sketched.
THE RELIEF PROBLEM
To estimate the burden of relief presents even greater statis-
tical difficulties than to estimate the volume of unemployment.
Relief is administered by cities, counties, states and the Federal
government, and by a great variety of private agencies. Fre-
quently aid extended by cities is paid out of state funds, while
states carry on relief activities with grants or loans from the
Federal government. In some cases both public and private relief
have been administered by local officials, in others they have been
independently administered. Prior to 1933 no agency was respon-
sible for the collection of information on relief throughout the
country. Nor was any comprehensive study undertaken of the
information scattered in the innumerable reports of local relief
agencies, public and private. Reliance must therefore be placed
on sample studies and estimates.
A study of the Cost of Family Relief in 100 Cities, 1929 and
1930 14showedthat the total amount spent on relief had already
13Adetailed description of the method used can be found in the American
Federationist, October 1933.Itis broadly similar to that of Dr. Givens.
14GlennSteele, Monthly Labor Review, April 1931.410 APPENDIX
increased very substantially during the first year of the depres-
sion. The tabulation shows aggregate expenditures, in thousands
of dollars, for this purpose in these cities, classified into two size
PERCENT-
AGE
CLASS OF CITIES 1929 1930INCREASE
6o cities with population of ioo,ooo or more$18,644 $35,848 92.3
40 cities with population of 50,000 to ioo,ooo2,248 3,549 57.9
Total $20,892 88.6
groups. It would appear that on the whole the larger cities ex-
perienced relatively more severe conditions in 1930. As to the
distribution of the burden between public and private agencies,
the returns from 75 of the ioo cities showed that while 6o per
cent of the disbursements in 1929 were derived from public
funds, the proportion had risen to 72 per cent in 1930.
As the depression progressed, the share of private funds in the
total amount spent for relief decreased. In 1931 a survey con-
ducted in 26 cities and information gathered from 158 others,
184 in showed that in 8o cities relief expenditures were be-
ing financed almost entirely from public funds, in 6o the relief
program was being carried on by private agencies with very little
assistance from public sources, and in 44 both public and private
agencies were operating simultaneously. It is difficult to deter-
mine on the basis of this sample just what portion of the funds
originated from private sources and how much was provided by
public agencies, because most of the larger cities had a mixed
program and the data from a majority of cities was not consid-
ered reliable by the authors of the survey. It is, however, signifi-
cant that in more than one-half of the cities covered by the
sample in the autumn of 1931 all relief work had to rely on
public funds.
In one of the few comprehensive estimates made of total an-
nual relief expenditures," the cost of relief is calculated in 1929
15 WorkRelief, by Joanna C. Colcord(Russell Sage Founda-
tion, 1932).
16CharlesE. Persons, Calculation of Relief Expenditures, American Statis-
tical Association Journal, Supplement, March 1933.COURSE OF DEPRESSION 411
tohave been $85,000,000., in 1930,$150,000,000, in1931,
ooo,ooo, and in 1932,$500,000,000.Figures of the Department of
Commerce 17showthat incitieswith a population of over 3o,ooo
on relief constituted
per cent of the total funds spent for that purpose in 1931.Assum-
ing that this ratio was true of the country as a whole for 1932,
governmentrelief expenditures for that year would have been
about
A very complete local report covering relief expenditures of
New York State, November i931 toOctober i933,19 showedthat
some 6oo,ooo family groups, representing approximately 2,500,000
persons, of whom i,ioo,ooo were children, had at one time or
another received aid from the state. From November i,1931 to
February i, 1934nearly$217,000,000 were spent. Up to Novem-
ber i, the Federal government had contributed over $37,-
ooo,ooo. After that date most of the financing was done with
CWA funds. During the first two years covered by the Report
the state spent about $ioo,ooo,ooo, with local bodies contribut-
ing about $89,000,000. During the year ending October 31,1932
themunicipalities carried approximately 55 per cent of the total
cost and the state 45 per cent. During the year ending October
31,1933approximately 43 per cent of the cost was met by local
funds, and 57 per cent had to be covered by state and Federal
funds. During the winter of 1933—34thestate acted as agent of
the Civil Works Administration, which operated with Federal
funds, and it continued to furnish funds only to those munici-
palities which were unable to carry on their own home relief
activities.
The first comprehensive data covering relief activities for the
country as a whole are given in the monthly Report of the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration for December 1933,whichin-
cludes the results of the operations of the Federal Civil Works
Special Report, Relief Expenditures by Governmental and Private Organ-
izations; 1929and
made by Simon Kuznets in connection with his estimate of total
national income, Bulletin 49, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 7,
1934.
19 Issuedby Governor Lehman, March ii,1934.412 APPENDIX
Administration from November i6, 1933tothe end of the year.
This Report shows that on May 22,1933, whenthe Federal
Emergency Relief Administration took office, about 4,250,000
families,or nearly ig,ooo,ooo persons, were receiving relief from
public funds. During May 1933approximately69 per cent of all
relief expenditures were financed by the Federal government, the
remainder being furnished by various local agencies whose funds
were becoming less and less adequate. Local governments were
still able, however, to contribute at the rate of about $23,000,000
permonth during the first quarter of 1933.Thereport contains
no mention of private funds, which had figured prominently in
the estimates of 1929and1930.Apparentlyin the fourth year of
the depression private sources were virtually exhausted.
The object of the Civil Works Administration was to provide
work for at least 4,000,000peopleduring the winter of 1933—34.
OnNovember 20,1933 allpersons on work relief rolls were
transferred to the payrolls of the CWA, and on the first pay day
1,108,692 workers received checks. By January i8, 19344,040,000
personswere employed. During the last quarter of 1933overto
per cent of the population was dependent on relief. During No-
vember, when the CWA began operations, 15,060,000persons,
exclusive of transients, or 12percent of the total population,
received relief from public funds. The sources of the relief funds
are shown in TableOver three-fifths were provided by the
Federal government.
The Report of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
for December 1933states(p. 72)thatthe data collected under the
Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933"constitutethe only source
of information covering the United States as a whole and bearing
on the subject of public unemployment relief." Prior to that time
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was advancing money
for relief purposes, but the figures it possesses on relief expendi-
tures for 1932areonly fragmentary. These figures represent ex-
penditures as reported by the governors of the states receiving
from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation relief funds under
the provision of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of
1932,butare subject to revisionwhen final reports are receivedCOURSE OF DEPRESSION 413
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PERIOD AMOUNT CENTAMOUNTCENTAMOUNTCENT TOTAL
.r933(in thousands) (in thousands)(in thousands) (in thousands)
ist quarter$68,622 33 $18,406 9 $122,380 $209,408
2nd quarter 52,865 25 20,590 Jo 136,701 65 210,156
3rd quarter 40,565 22 26,855 15 113,553 180,973
4th quarter 37,751 20 46,508 24 107,967 56 192,226
1St quarter 31,926 i8 61,885 34 49 181,362
2nd quarter 55,588 15 41,479 11 270,634 74 367,701
3rd quarter 69,296i6 9 316,359 75 422,199
4th quarter 67,086 13 46,701 9 394,290 78 508,077
Total $422,797 19$299,370 13$1,549,936 68$2,272,103
Source: Monthly Reports of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration
1Partlyestimated.
from them. Moreover, the total expenditures estimated cover
only August to December inclusive, as Federal funds were not
available prior to August 1932. Figures on expenditures prior to
this period are not obtainable, and data from states which did
not apply for Federal relief funds during 1932 are also lacking.
Thirty-five states applied for relief from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation from August to December 1932. It was at
that time using local and state funds for relief, and contributions
from private sources, national organizations and others. These
divisions of the sources of relief funds are not of great signifi-
cance,forthe funds distributed by thesesources overlap,
especially local funds which states frequently advance. The Re-.
construction Finance Corporation disbursed sums far greater than
any of these other sources of relief during this period, providing
$72,337,347.06 out of a total of $100,387,314.54 for relief from
August to December.
It must again be emphasized, however, that these figures are
not inclusive of all relief expenditures even for these five months.
New York State relief expenditures, for example, are not included
in this estimate because the State did not apply for Federal relief414 APPENDIX
funds during that period. Nor did most of thestates that did
apply turn to. the Federal government until October 1932,so
that the figures for August and September are still more incom-
plete than the later figures. More than half of the total relief
funds reported spent during the five months were disbursed by
Illinois and Pennsylvania, which paid out respectively $29,000,000
and$22,000,000.
Therewas a progressive rise in the funds allotted for relief not
only by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation but also by the
sources enumerated above. In August 1932lessthan $i,ooo,ooo
was spent by agencies other than the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. In December more than $Ió,000,000wasspent.
Likewise the Reconstruction Finance Corporation contributed
only about $6,ooo,ooo in August, against more than $26,000,000
inDecember.
It is clear that an estimate of relief funds employed in 1932
mustbe based upon a very uncertain and incomplete figure for
the last five months of the year. The figure is subject to revision
and accordingly must be used with caution. Nevertheless, it is
the best available, and does give some indication of the
of relief expenditure during 1932,andthe gradual swelling of
the total sum.APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII
PUBLIC WORKS PROCEDURE IN NEW YORK CITY
"BUDGET-MAKING for all of the ordinary expenditures of the city
is still a more or less casual process. The budget document of
New York City is little more than an itemized appropriation
ordinance. It contains no estimate of the income that is expected
to meet proposed expenditures. The steps involved in its prepara-
tion are as follows: early in the spring the Board of Estimate re-
quests the heads of 165 departments, boards and bureaus to
prepare and submit their estimates of all expenditures for the
coming year. It is expected that the departmental estimates will
be submitted by July ioth,, although the time limit set by the
City Charter for their submission is August 1st. They are not,
however, all received even by the latter date, but keep coming in
throughout July, August and September. Numerous supplement-
ary departmental estimates not mentioned in the Charter are
submitted even as late as October, the date when the Committee
of the Whole of the Board of Estimate is required to approve
of the tentative budget.
When received by the secretary of the Board, the departmental
estimates are assigned to theexaminers of the Board of
Estimate. Each examiner studies the estimates under his jurisdic-
tion and holds conferences with the specified department head
and the Director of the Budget. Estimates with attached recom-
mendations are then forwarded on or before October 4th to the
Committee of the Whole of the Board of Estimate. This body
holds hearings with departmental heads on the estimates, and on
or before October ioth adopts a printed tentative budget. Public
hearings are again held later to consider principally additions to
the tentative budget. Before October 20th the Board must file
with its secretary a budget known as the Proposed Budget. Before
415
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this filing date items of the budget may be increased or new ones
added, but after October 20th revision can only be downward or
by elimination. After public hearings are held on the proposed
budget, the final budget is adopted on or before October 31st.
Five days after the budget has been passed by the Board of Esti-
mate it must go to the Board of Aldermen, which is given
twenty days for its consideration. But this body has practically
forsworn any part in budget-making. Deliberations on the
budget, so far from twenty days, consume on some occasions no
more than twenty minutes. Not over four or five times in the
past thirty years has the Board of Aldermen made any change
in a budget.
Capital Outlays on Public Improvements. The budget in-
cludes very few items for permanent improvements. The several
small items for permanent improvements included in it, such
as armory buildings, park improvements, construction of a
municipal airport, expenses of engineering forces engaged on
construction and designing of the new subways amount, in the
aggregate, to a sum relatively not large. Capital outlays on per-
manent improvements are financed, for decidedly the greater
part, by issue of long-term corporate stock or bonds. If emergency
funds were required in times of depression for the relief of un-
employment through an increased volume of expenditures on
public works, it' would matter little that the procedure involved
in making budget appropriations is long and cumbersome, pro-
vided only that these unusual expenditures did not come out of
current revenue but were financed by the issue of long-term
bonds or by temporary borrowing. Capital expenditures in New
York City are not planned in any comprehensive manner, except
in the case of subways and water supply. Various projects are
authorized from time to time during the year, and the tax budget
is adopted in November with no indication of the outlays which
the city will make from the proceeds of the sale of bonds.
The procedure involved in the authorization of capital issues
is as follows: the various departments submit, at its request, to
the Board of Estimate, usually in December (but also at various
times during the year for specific projects), a list of items deemedNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 417
urgentand their requests for a given amount of corporate stock
or tax notes for these desired improvements. These items are
placed either on the current calendar of the Board or else on a
special calendar of the Committee of the Whole printed early
in the year—the so-called corporate stock and tax note calendar.
As new items are added the calendar is revised or supplements
to it are prepared. Items are picked from this calendar, acted
upon by the Board of Estimate and approved early in the year.
Thereafter speciEc newitemsare received and then considered
by the Board through the Committee of the Whole. No special
order is observed in the consideration of the items, except when
the corporate stock budget is considered, nor is an attempt made
to formulate a budget or program of capital expenditures.
Authorizations are thus made in a piecemeal fashion and not all
at one time as is the case with tax budget expenditures.
The city is not required to issue bonds and have cash actually
in hand before proceeding with the execution of a project. The
authorization is itself considered as equivalent to an appropria-
tion and contracts may be immediately awarded. When obliga-
tions incurred in this way become payable, that is, when the
contractors present their bills, money is secured by the issuance
of corporate stock notes which mature within a period of one
year unless renewed or converted into long-term stock.
In short, the procedure is as follows:
1.Requestsby the departments are made to the Board of
Estimate directly or indirectly.
2.Authorizationsare made by the Board at any time during
the year.
Contractsare awarded.
4. Corporate stock notes are issued in liquidation of the
obligations incurred.
Thesenotes are converted into long-term stock.
Borrowing by New York City is usually preceded by the issue
of corporate stock notes. Long term obligations therefore are not
incurred until the expenditures have been made. It is argued
that such an arrangement is more economical than that obtain-
ing in many cities which issue bonds when the project is author-418 APPENDIX
ized and in advance of its execution, since it enables the city to
choose the most favorable time for the issuance of its long term
stock or bonds. It may also put its obligations on the market in
large blocks of $50,000,000 or $6o,ooo,oootoattractactive
bidding.
Should no sale of long-term stock occur before their maturity,
corporate stock notes may be renewed and the renewals
deemed from the next sale of stock. The total amount of such
notes and renewals must at no time exc.eed four-fifths of the
amount of corporate stock or serial bonds authorized to be
issued" (Planning and Control of Public Works, pp. 20—25).
TAX AND DEBT LIMITS OF NEW YORK CITY
New York City, like the cities of other states, is restricted by
state constitutional provisions in its power to raise taxes and
incur debts. The Constitution of New York (Article VIII, Sec-
tion io) limits the rate of taxes which may be levied for city and
county purposes, exclusive of interest and amortization charges
on the funded debt, to 2 per cent of the assessed valuation of
real and personal property subject to taxation for county and
state purposes. The same section of the Constitution fixes the
limit of the net debt of counties and cities in the State of New
York, with certain important and quite considerable exceptions
in the case of New York City, at io per cent of the assessed
valuation of real property subject to taxation. No county or city,
therefore, is allowed to become indebted to an amount which,
including existing indebtedness, exceeds ten per cent of the
assessed valuation of the real estate of the county or city subject
to taxation. To this Article, however, there are certain general
exceptions. Debts incurred for these purposes are outside the
debt limit in all cities of the state. Such are certificates of in-
debtedness or revenue bonds issued in anticipation of the collec-
tion of taxes; likewise debts contracted to provide for water
supply facilities.
The Debt-incurring Power of New York City. In computingNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII 419
thedebt-incurring power of the city within the debt limit, the
following deductions from its gross indebtedness are to be made:
i.Bondsissued by the city to be redeemed out of the tax levy
for the next succeeding the year of their issue, provided
that the amount of such bonds which may be issued in any one
year in excess of the debt limitation does not exceed one-tenth
of one per cent of the assessed valuation of the real estate of the
city subject to taxation.
2.SinkingFund accumulations, since the indebtedness re-
ferred to by the constitutional amendment is net and not gross
indebtedness.
3. The debt of the counties consolidated into New York City,
as it existed at the time of the consolidation, which is exempted
by an amendment to the Constitution in 1899.
4.Water bonds and water corporate stock notes issued after
December 31,1903, exemptedby constitutional amendment of
1905.
5.Certain revenue-producing improvements for New York
City which, after deduction of all repairs and maintenance,
netted a revenue in excess of debt charges, exempted by con-
stitutional amendment of 1909.Ineffect, this means that some
subway and dock bonds were exempted from the debt limit to
the extent that they were self-sustaining. This exemption is
available only for rapid transit and dock improvements.
6. Debts not exceeding $300,000,000,,incurredby the city after
January i,1928, forthe construction and equipment of subways,
exempted by constitutional amendment in November 1927.
Aftermaking these deductions there must be added to the
resulting figure the non-funded contract and land liabilities and
open market orders. The sum obtained is the total indebtedness
within the debt limit, and after this is subtracted from the total
debt-incurring power of the city within the debt limit (that is,
io per cent of the assessed valuation of taxable real estate), the
difference is the constitutional debt-incurring power of the city
within the debt limit as of a certain date. This debt margin
naturally fluctuates from year to year. An increase in assessed420 APPENDIX
valuation increases the margin. On the other hand, it is reduced
by the inauguration of new public improvements.
"On frequent occasions the debt limit has proved to be highly
embarrassing to the city, and repeated constitutional amendments
have been adopted for the purpose of increasing the borrowing
powers of the city. These substantial increases, however, have not
removed the fear of like difficulties in the future. The city could
not have proceeded with its subway construction program had
not subway debts to the extent of $300,000,000 been specifically
exempted by the constitutional amendment of November 8, 1927.
Thus a city in the position of New York might, in times of
emergency, when it is desired to expand public construction, be
prevented from increasing capital expenditures by borrowing, in
consequence of the nearness of its debt to the debt limit, unless
the cumbersome procedure involved in first obtaining an exemp-
tion through an amendment to the state constitution be invoked"
(Planning and Control of Public Works) p. 38).
Increases in the city debt-incurring power may also come from
a rise in the total valuation of taxable property. "There is also
available a third method (of expanding the debt limit) which,
while it does not make possible a larger outstanding debt at any
given moment, does make it possible to borrow a larger aggre-
gate amount in a given period of time, at the cost of increasing
current revenues by the same amount.... Thisthird method
Consists of shortening the term of new bonds issued and/or of
redeeming (them) before maturity, or merely through the accu-
mulation of larger resources in the sinking funds",, which are
deductible from gross income in computing the city's net indebt-
edness. "By issuing fifty year bonds, the city has frozen its credit
so that its program of permanent improvements is seriously men-
aced....Shorterterms for city bonds would make the borrowed
moneys revolve more quickly. The same amount of constitutional
debt-incurring capacity would therefore permit the city to per-
form double the amount of work" (Lehman Report on The
Finances and Financial Administration of New York City, pp.
216, 220—21). This was one of the chief advantages of the Delaney
plan for financing subway construction with short-term bonds.r
APPENDIX C
FINANCIAL CONDITION OF SELECTED LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS DURING THE DEPRESSION
INTRODUCTION
ALThOUGH the PWA is not restricted, as was the RFC, to making
emissions only for revenue-producing improvements, the charac-
ter of its aid necessitates the observance of certain precautions.
Before the Federal government authorizes a loan to any commu-
nity it must decide upon the appropriateness of the project; the
government must make certain that local officials are not resort-
ing to 'pork-barrel' tactics. Furthermore, since the underlying
purpose of emergency public works is to stimulate employment,
the Administration must attempt to gauge the extent of relief to
be afforded by projected construction. And last, but not least
important of considerations, it must ascertain the financial status
of the community demanding the loan. The credit rating of a
( municipalityis determined by several factors: the condition of its
budget, the size and composition of its bonded indebtedness, its
debt service costs, the character of its debt administration, and
the steps taken to improve existing financial conditions.
To communities where the need for public improvements and
unemployment relief is especially urgent but where the financial
position, for one reason or another,, precludes recourse to bor-
rowing, the Federal government has donated funds as outright
grants. In most instances, however, the PWA has tried to limit
its grants to 30 per cent of its authorization to the municipality.
The sections which follow are resumés of more detailed financial
analyses made by Wylie Kilpatrick for the Federal government
in an effort to determine the validity of authorizing loans for
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public works to these particular cities.' These reports reveal quite
clearly the demoralized state of local finances during the depres-
sion and the impossibility of setting up an absolute criterion for
determining the right of any community to receive a loan and
the size of the loan to be granted. The very fact, however, that
the cities mentioned in this survey have received aid from the
Federal government is indicative of their basic financial sound-
ness. It is doubtful, therefore, to what extent this sample may be
considered representative of municipalities as a whole.
THE SANITARY DISTRICT OF CHICAGO
The Sanitary District, which now comprises about 47 per cent
of the area of Cook County, Contains within its boundaries some
sixty municipalities, including the City of Chicago. The District
was created as a municipal corporation by an act of the Illinois
Legislature, approved May 1889,withthe power to levy taxes
and incur indebtedness subject to the constitutional limitation
of 5 per cent of the assessed valuation. Its primary function was
to prevent the contamination of Chicago's source of water sup-
ply, Lake Michigan, by effecting some method of sewage
other than that of directing all sewage into the Lake. The origi-
nal plan was to dilute the sewage with water and then direct it,
by canal and river, into the Mississippi. This plan was put into
operation but was opposed by the southern cities of Illinois and
by Missouri. Finally, in 1930, the Unted States Supreme Court
directed the Sanitary District or the State of Illinois to complete
a sewage treatment system and cease the undue diversion of
water from Lake Michigan.
Since the chief function of the District has been that of a con-
struction agency, its budgets have been dominated by bond sales
and expenditures. Thus on the average from 1927 to 1929 ap-
proximately one-half of income was from bond sales, and the
1Thesereports prepared by Dr. Kilpatrick are detailed analyses of the
financialstatus of various municipal governments:cities,counties,dis-
tricts. In addition, the reports contain statistics and discussions describing
the social and economic resources of these communities. No use has been
made of the material on Counties iflthefollowing summaries.FINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 423
annual budget fluctuated between $40,000,000and$6o,ooo,ooo,
whereas in 1931and1932,whenbond sales were small, the an-
nual budgets were respectively $22,000,000and In-
come of the District, excluding bond sale proceeds, is derived
mainly from taxes; the rate levied has fluctuated between and
$6 per $i,ooo. The District's electrical power plant has not been
very lucrative. Chicago, the chief customer, has never paid for
service received, and on June 30,1933 owed$7,907,215.
Tax income of the District was sharply curtailed following the
assessment review begun in i 928 (see Ch. VII). Collections were
not resumed until 1930, and, as a result, the Sanitary District,
as well as all other Cook County units, is now two years in
arrears in the levying of taxes. The rate of delinquency in the
collection of taxes has risen sharply. The curtailment of revenue
may be mitigated in the near future by the operation of the
Illinois law which permits the County Treasurer to become a
receiver of delinquent properties. He may operate the properties
until taxes are paid.
As indicated above, borrowed funds have furnished the chief
source of income of the Sanitary District. As of August i,,1933,
the indebtedness of the District totalled $142,565,480, distributed
as follows. As of the same date, the total borrowing margin (5
In default $10,084,500
Notin default 96,947,500
Interest on defaulted bonds 5,417,580
Constructing contracts 8,600,500
Electric power contract 18,500,000
Unpaidbills, salaries and wages 736,000
Leases 245,000
Taxanticipation warrants and interest 2,034,400
Total $142,565,480
per cent of the 1931assessment)of the District was $183,183,629.
Since tax anticipation warrants and interest were then deduct-
ible, the unused borrowing margin was $42,652,549. On Decem-
ber i6, the PWA purchased bonds of the District in the amount424 APPENDIX
of1,938,000,2thereby virtually eliminating the unused borrow-
ing margin. On January 1,,1934, the 1932 assessment became
effective. This assessment, 25 per cent lower than that of 1931,
reduced the borrowing margin to $137,387,722. If only the in-
crease in funded debt is added to the total indebtedness as of
August 1, it is apparent that the District had exceeded its
borrowing margin by $45,081,358 Ofl January 1, 1934. Thus until
assessments increase or a large amount of obligations are retired,
the District will legally be unable to participate in any new
borrowing.
The District first defaulted upon its obligations on January 1,
1932 when it found itself unable to sell tax anticipation war-
rants. As of June 30, 1933, there were in default $10,084,500 of
bonds and $5,417,580 of interest, a total of $15,502,080. On April
1, 1934, the Sanitary District defaulted on an interest payment
of $120,172.50 due to the Federal government for its loan. The
immediate cause of this defalcation was the postponement of the
penalty date on 1932 taxes from February 1, 1934 to April 15,
1934, fifteen days after the interest payment came due. Possi-
bilities of rapid improvement in meeting maturities and interest
payments are not evident.
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN
Even prior to the depression, Milwaukee showed inability to
stay within the bounds of its budget, but interestingly enough,
despite extraordinarily large tax delinquencies, it is now in a
more secure budgetary position than it was in 1929, when it had
a budget deficit of $11,604,729 and there was no balance in the
treasury at the beginning of the year. In 1932 this deficit had
been reduced to $1,742,514, exclusive of balance. Current expen-
diture accounts were less seriously out of balance. In 1929 there
was a deficit of $5,692,915 but in 1932 this had been converted
into a surplus of $2,869,713. The huge discrepancy of 1929 had
resulted from large expenditures for capital outlays. The rapid
2Themoney was to be used for a sewage treatment plant as ordered by
the United States Supreme Court.a,-
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and extensive industrial development of Milwaukee during the
prosperity era, and the consequent growth in population, necessi
tated a large program of permanent improvements. During the
decade 1922—31 permanent improvement costs for city jurisdic-
tions aggregated approximately $110,742,531. Milwaukee early
adopted the pay-as-you-go method of financing a large part of
its improvements, and of the above total only 44.1 per cent was
financed from bonds; 21.8 per cent was financed from taxes and
miscellaneous revenue, 22.8 per cent from special assessments,
and 11.3 per cent from the sale of water. Since many of the
improvements during construction were financed from available
cash balances, the absorption of the city balance n.ecessitated
recourse to temporary loans. In 1929 the charges for this current
indebtedness were $6,056,566, 70 per cent more than in 1932.
Revenue receipts for 1932 showed a 41.6 per cent increase over
1929. General property tax revenue mounted almost twice as fast,
despite widespread delinquency. Almost all other revenues de-
creased. Expenditures in 1932 surpassed those in 1929 in all items
except public service enterprises, capital outlays, and repayment
of current borrowing. These three items, however, were pared to
such an extent that total expenditures decreased 5.7 per cent
during that period. Capital outlays were, in 1929, 24 per cent
of total expenditure; in 1932, 17 per cent. The net results of






Deficit,inclusiveof balance $11,604,729$532,989 —95.4
Deficit,exclusiveofbalance 11,604,729 1,742,514 —85.0
Current operations
Totalcurrentrevenue(exclusive
of balance and special assessments)22,511,34935,664,431+58.4
Totalcurrentexpenditure(in-
cluding payment of principal of
funded debt) 28,204,26432,794,7 i8




Ratio of true debt service(i.e., exclusive of
temporary loans)to current expenditure 16.2 iB.t
Ratio of complete debt service(I.e., includ-
ing temporary loans) to total expenditure iG.8 12.5
Capital outlays
Ratio of ouflays to total expenditure 24.1 16.9
Netbonded debt




Up to December 31, 1933 Milwaukee was clear of defaults and
did not resort to refunding. Wisconsin limits the life of bond
issues to twenty years, which precludes the possibility of unduly
prolonging them when issues are redeemed on the date due.
Owing to the general use of serial bonds, sinking funds are not
large and no sinking fund deficits occurred.
It was not without an effort, however, that defaults or post-
ponements were warded off in Two attacks were made on
Milwaukee's methods of financing. One suit questioned the right
to use cash on hand and the proceeds of unused bond balances,
the other claimed that the constitutional debt limit had been
exceeded. As a consequence of these suits, the city found its
ability to make loans from the banks, in anticipation of tax
collections, seriously jeopardized. By the issuance of 'baby bonds'
and by delaying the payment of city orders, Milwaukee was able
to meet the payment of approximately $4,000,000interestand
principal on its bonded debt without borrowing from the banks.
In 1934thesituation, while still serious, was eased by an in-
creased borrowing capacity, no interest on .bank loans, employ-
ment of debt amortization fund,3 and reduced tax delinquency.
From 1924to the net debt chargeable against theper
The slow collection of taxes lfl 1933 resulted in a serious cash shortage.
Payrolls and bond interest and maturities had to be met. After legisla-
tive sanction the amortization fund disposed of bonds it held and the
proceeds were invested in tax certificates, thus replenishing the treasury.FINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 427
cent debt limit increased steadily; after a slight drop in 1930,
the net debt increased so sharply that the ratio was carried above
the legal limit in 1932. That year the net debt was 5.2 per cent
of assessments, 0.2 per cent above the legal borrowing capacity.
On December 31, 1933, however, the net debt had been reduced
from $47,480,000 tO $39,588,700; the ratio of net debt to assessed
valuation for the same date was 4.6 per cent, leaving a margin of
$3,002,372 for 1934 issues. The out-of-bounds borrowing in 1932
is partly explained by the reduction in margin caused by a io
per cent drop in valuation from 1929 to 1932. All of this decrease
was not caused by shrinkage of values. Large assessment litiga-
dons in 1932, the exemption of automobiles in 1931 from the
personal property assessment, and the transference in 1929 of
the power and light companies' assessment from localities to the
state all contributed to the decrease. Furthermore, new debt in-
curred by Milwaukee has been of the type not deductible from
the debt limit.
The largest portion of Milwuakee's general bonded indebted-
ness for 1922—32 was incurred for sewage systems under the admin-
istration of the independent Metropolitan Sewage Commission,
established in 1921. The other cities included in the Metropoli-
tan Sewage area are now paying Milwaukee for their share of
this outlay before 1921. Next in importance was school debt,
which increased steadily with the growth of the city. Of signifi-
cance was the marked increase during 1931 and 1932 in debt for
parks and playgrounds, part of Milwaukee's program for social
services. The accompanying tabulation summarizes the debt posi-




Revenue bonds and notes $519,910-$1,823,000$ 3,125,000
Warrants 1,533,754 1,409,169
General improvement bonds 32,866,30047,821,05051,441,800
Public utilities 355,000 242,000 39,000




Offset for sinking fund assets and
maturing bonds 1,698,664 3,370,150 3,96i ,8oo
Public utilities 355,000 242,000 39,000
Total deductions $4,501,164$6,844,319$7,i 25,800
Net debt $30,773,800$44,450,900$47,480,000
Relation of debts to valuation (in percentage form)
Ratio of gross debt to valuation 4.7 5.2 6.o
Ratio of net debt to valuation 4.1 4.5 5.2
Milwaukee's unfunded debt, consisting of revenue bonds, notes
and warrants, did not increase from 1929 to 1932, although the
city was increasingly troubled in 1932 and 1933 by a shortage of
cash. Unfunded debt in 1933 amounted to $5,000,000 in tax re-
demption notes or 'baby bonds', and $3,500,000 in city orders.
Payrolls for city employees and school teachers were met half in
'baby bonds' and half in cash during May, June, September,
October, November.andDecember of 1933. Both bonds and
orders for city supplies virtually became script in Milwaukee and
were accepted in payment of city taxes of any kind. Of the
500,000orders issued in 1933, less than $2,500,000 were outstand-
ing on January 1, 1934, and of $5,000,000 in 'baby bonds' author-
ized on December 12 only $2,597,560 were outstanding. The city
had received $582,420 in payment of pledged certificates and
$1,820,020 was on hand still to be issued.
Two interesting features of Milwaukee's bonded debt are the
absence of assessment bonds and (until 1933) the negligible size
of the public utility debt. The city pays for assessments from
current revenue and is in turn paid by the taxpayer within six
years in six installments. Formerly the largest item of special
assessment was for sewage systems. The creation of the Metro-
politan Sewage District in 1921, however, made it possible for
the city to abandon this function. The public utility debt of
Milwaukee in 1924 was the smallest of any city of the same
population class in the United States, and the same was true in
1929 and 1932. This class of debt, furthermore, declined fromFINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 429
1924 to 1932.TheFederal loan and grant of $4,600,000 for a
water filtration plant in 1933 meant a reversal of this utility
debt reduction policy. Milwaukee has no debt classification for
relief since, under Wisconsin law, the entire burden of relief
falls upon the county.
In view of the budgetary difficulties of Milwaukee, it is inter-
esting that the Federal government approved two large loans.
The loan made for an extension to the sewage disposal plant
does not, however, make any incursion on the unused borrowing
margin (which was $3,002,372 Ofl December 1933) since the
money has been borrowed by the county on behalf of the City
Sewage Commission. Furthermore, since Wisconsin law permits
the deduction from gross debt of utility debt, when this debt is
secured by mortgages against the property or income of the
utility, the $4,600,000 could not affect the borrowing capacity of
the city.
CINCINNATI, OHIO
The income of Cincinnati declined 11.5 per cent between 1928
and 1932. Income from all taxation decreased over 12 per cent
between these dates, but gasoline and inheritance taxes increased
considerably. The probable explanation of the growth of the
former is more efficient certification of refineries and collection
of the tax and increased consumption of gasoline. The greater
return from the inheritance tax must be due to a higher death
rate among Cincinnati property owners, since receipts from this
source in other large Ohio Cities declined during the same pe-
riod. The only other increase in revenue was from special assess-
ments. Income derived from borrowing declined more than 15
per cent.
An important contributory cause of decreasing revenue was
tax delinquency. As reported for Hamilton County, 8o per cent
of whose population lives in Cincinnati, tax delinquency grew
from 3.46 per cent in 1929 to 11.44 per cent in 1933. Compared








































































































































6.46Total other outlay 6,393 12.66 5,933 12.62 —7.20
Debt obligations 11.26 5,439 11.57 —4.33
Other 22,643 44.83 40.04 —16.91
Total non-governmental 28,329 56.09 24,254 51.61 —14.38
Total expenditure 50,510 100.00 46,995 ioo.oo —6.g6
Balance, end of year 10,094 4,484 . —55.58 —
Surplusor deficit
Exclusive of balance at beginning of year —82 —2412













assessments, usually heavier than taxes, rose from 15.5 per cent
in 1929to21.2percent in 1933.Theattenuation of assessed
values was an additional factor in reducing the city's tax income,
and, at the same time, in narrowing the unused borrowing
margin.
Cincinnati's total expenditures were pared as income declined.
Between 1928and1932 they were reduced by approximately 7
per cent. Although the diminution in receipts exceeded the re-
duction in expenditures, cash balances from previous years were
sufficient to prevent actual deficits. Table g6 indicates how the
budget was balanced.
In 1932totaloperations, exclusive of cash balances, showed
a $2,400,000 deficit, but this was converted into a surplus of
$4,483,532 by inclusion of the cash balance at the beginning of
the year. The unencumbered cash balance at the beginning of
1934 of $950,000istestimony tothe economical budgetary
administration of the city.
The City Council, anxious to continue its solvency, made
extremely conservative budget estimates for 1934. Estimated re-
ceipts, including unexpended balances, amounted to $14,659,787,
as compared with an estimated $19,428,130 for 1933. The 1934
appropriation was set at $14,629,787, leaving an estimated bal-
ance, unexpended, of $30,000.
The efficient administration of Cincinnati's budget by the City
Council is further demonstrated by the Council's handling of
the debt. The city did not default payment of either principal
or interest and resorted to very little refunding. The sinking
fund completed its1933 operations with a cash balance of
$834,100, which was in excess of the cash balance at the
close of 1932. Cincinnati has remained within its debt limit, and
although the unused borrowing margin is relatively small, the
$275,000 loans approved by the Federal government would not
endanger this margin. The accompanying tabulation illustrates
clearly Cincinnati's ability to assume further debt for public
works. All figures are for December 1933.FINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 433
Total borrowing margin $40,483,000
Total gross debt $99,922,203
Allowable deductions 62,073,043
Total net debt $37,849,161
Unused borrowing margin $2,633,839
Less Federal loans 275,000
Net unused margin $2,358,839
Percentage which net debt bears to assessment 4.67
The servicecostofCincinnati'sindebtednessisheavy,
slightly more than 40 per cent of current expenditures and
a little less than 20 per cent of total income.
CLEVELAND, OHIO
Cleveland experienced severe financial difficulties as a result
of the depression. Total revenues shrank from $112,300,000 in
1929 to $87,900,000 in 1932—22 per cent. Though expendi-
tures were cuti8 per cent in the same period,they were
$9,610,329 in excess of receipts in1932 as compared with
$6,374,569 in 1928. An actual deficit was forestalled by re-
course to cash balances available at the beginning of each
year. Total receipts and balances thus exceeded total expendi-
tures, in 1928 by $21,995,511, and in 1932 by $14,487,497.
Cleveland'scurrentbudget,exclusiveofcashbalances,
showed large operating deficits both in1928 and 1932,al-
though the deficit was considerably reduced in the latter year.
Current expenditures (in this instance, total operation, main-
tenance and interest, plus payment of funded debt) exceeded
current receipts(total revenue receipts,lessspecialassess-
ments) in 1928 by $11,783,433 and in1932 by $7,243,043.
This reduction of $4,540,390 or 38.5 per cent in the current
deficit is explained by the fact that retrenchment was greater
than the reduction in revenue in 1932. Owing to cash balances,
current deficits occurred in neither year.
Taxandspecialassessmentdelinquenciescontributed
greatly to Cleveland's fiscaltroubles. The cumulative delin-
quency on special assessments rose from $2,551,276 in 1930
to $5,486,624 in 1933, and total collections in 1933 amounted434 APPENDIX
to only 51percent of the current levy. Tax delinquency was
not quite so serious; the 1933collectionsof current and back
taxes were 8i per cent of the levy for that year; in 1932,83
per cent. In an effort to induce prompt payment, the old law
allowing tax-payers four years of grace before confiscation of
property was replaced by a Tax Receivership Bill,signed
April 5,1934, which "permits the courts to appoint county
treasurersasreceivers for income producing properties on
which taxes are delinquent. The receivers will have jurisdic-
tion of the property until all the delinquent taxes are paid."
Table 97 shows the composition of Cleveland's debt and
its debt status in 1933.Thedecrease in special assessment debt
from 14to4 per cent of the total debt in the five-year period
was partly offset by the growth of temporary loans. Ohio law
permits the assumption of net debt up to 5 per cent of the
assessed valuation. Tables 97 shows that in1933Cleveland
exceeded its legal limit by more than $20,000,000.Netcity
debt was 6.7 per cent of assessed valuation as compared with
3 per cent in 1929.Thisincrease was partly the outcome of
the percent expansion of net debt and partly of the 40
percent shrinkage in property valuation over the five-year
period.
Up to February1,1934 Clevelandmet allits maturing
obligations and interest payments. On that date it defaulted
on its maturing general bonds but paid all interest due and
maturing bonds forspecialassessment,water works, and
electriclight.Payments were again deferred on March1,
andaccording to The Bond Buyer of March 17,Cleveland
had defaulted on obligations aggregating $i,6oo,ooo, of which
$467,000 represented overdue March payments. The condi-
tion of its unfunded debt is also significant. Although Cleve-
land has not had recourse to refunding of general obligations,
a tax anticipation note in the amount of $1,250,000,firstdue
in June of 1932,hasbeen repeatedly renewed. There were also
two issues of scrip, totaling $1,857,500,usedto pay city em-
ployees, and issued against the uncollected current levy forTABLE 97
CLEVELAND, OHIO
DEBT STATUS, 1929 AND 1933 1
1929 1933 PERCENTAGE
AMOUNT I'ER CENT AMOUNT PER CENT OF CHANGE
(in thousands) (in thousands)
General bonds $74,420 59.75 $83,107 11.67
Limitationexcess bonds ... ... 4,811 3.76 Z
Specialassessment debt 17,150 13.69 5,389 4.22 —68.39 C)
Water works bonds 25,978 20.86 26,090 20.41 4.35
Electric light bonds 7,105 5.7 5,317 4.16 —25.05
Tax anticipation notes (due ..
. 1,250 .98 ...
Scrip(due 10.15.38) ... 875 .68
Scrip (due 12-15.38) ... 982 .77 ...





Other legal deductions 10,316
Total deductions 43,046
Difference 84,776
Sinking funds applicable thereto 3,971
Total net debt subject to limitation 80,805
Total legal borrowing capacity (legal limit) 60,456 Z
Amountby which debt exceeds legal limit 20,349
1 Balance of $6,498,000 four percent Sewage Disposal bonds sold to PWA.436 APPENDIX
general operating purposes for 1933. Of the first issue of $875,-
000, $6oo,ooo was returned to the city to be reissued.
The large Federal loan of $6,498,000 and grant of $2,492,-
ooo would be exempt from the 5 per cent legal limitation
since the loan isto be secured by mortgage revenue bonds
and istherefore self-supporting. For this reason,the loan
appears to be valid although Cleveland has already exceeded
its debt limit. In view of the difficulty that the city has expe-
rienced in meeting its existing debt payment, however, it may
not be in a position to support easily this additional debt.
DES MOINES, IOWA
Between 1921—22 and 1932—33 totalexpenditures of Des
Moinesdropped from$4,096,944to$2,982,091.Between
1921—22 and 1929—30 expenditures decreased20percent,
and a further 9 per cent between 1929—30 and 1932—33. Ex-
clusive of cash balances at the beginning of the year,total
operations disclosed a surplus of $169,180 for192 1—22, and
for 1929—30 and 1932—33 deficits of $113,009 and $123,869,
respectively.The inclusion of cash balances converted these
deficits into surpluses.
Des Moines' tax revenue was not seriously affected by the
depression. While a small reduction in tax levies accompanied
a much larger shrinkage in assessed values, the tax rate re-
mained the same. In 1932 the delinquency rate was about 6
per cent.
Tndebtedness, as of January1934, was $11,363,028. This
represents a reduction of $1,666,346 from the peak of 1929.
The decline in net debt was slightly larger. Both general city
obligations and special fund bonds declined between 1922
and 1929. The net increase of indebtedness was due chiefly to
the issue and sale of public utility bonds to construct a
water works system. Table 98 shows that Des Moines exceeded
its 5 per cent constitutional debt limit in 1929 and The
city,however, claimed the additional exemption of waterFINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 437
TABLE g8
DES MOINES, IOWA
INDEBTEDNESS, 1922, 1929 AND
(in thousands)
(as of December 31)
COMPOSITIONOF DEBT 1922 1929 1933
Unfundeddebt $69 $260'
General bonds 4,757 3,460
Special fund bonds 3,610 2,086 1,966
Special assessment bonds .. ... 275
Public utility bonds ... 5,450 5,403
Miscellaneous bonds ... 668
Total debt 10,099 13,029 11,363
Deductions allowable 401 595 1,270
Net debt 9,697 12,366 10,093
Unused borrowing capacity $i,oii —$851 —$i,8g3
An estimate of warrants outstanding as of December 31,1933.
bonds, the exclusion of which not only eliminated the mar-
ginal deficits but also resulted in adequate surplus margins.
• During the depression assessed valuations in Des Moines
declined more than in many other cities owing to the pecu-
liarity of its assessment base. The latter includes money and
credit in addition to personal and real property. In 1933
total assessments were approximately io per cent below the
•1929 level and the estimated valuation for indicated a
reduction of 21 per cent.
In 1922, gross debt was 4.7 per cent of assessment, 5.65 per
cent in 1929, and 6.92 per cent in 1934. The proportion of
net debt to assessment moved similarly. Although outstanding
debt declined after1929,the debt service requirements in-
creased. The ratio of debt serviceto current expenditure,
which had fallen from 45.5 per cent in 1921—22 to 21.9 per
cent in 1929—30, rose to 25.5 per cent in 1932—33. A study
of maturing rates reveals that debt service charge require-
ments will increase up to and including 1942. Owing to de-
clining revenues these charges bear more heavily upon the city
than formerly. Federal grants totalling $138,250 will, of course,
not affect the total debt or service charges.438 APPENDIX
BUFFALO, NEW YORK
The surplus oftotal income over total expenditures in
Buffalo was $3,360,566 ifl 1930 and $676,990 ifl 1933. Current
operations (all income exclusive of borrowing and all expendi-
ture exclusive of capital outlays and that part of the debt
service not paid from current income) showed a surplus of
$1,130,329 rn 1930 and a deficit of $4,650,535 in 1933. Tn the
latter year borrowings aggregated $24,532,410 rn comparison
with capital outlays of $1,533,189 and welfare relief of $9,821,-
348. The reduction of almost half in the ratio of the true
debt service to current expenditures resulted from the refund-
ing of $4,000,000 of maturing bonds in 1933, while the ratio
of complete debt service to total expenditures decreased from
ig.6 per cent in 1930 to 2.4 per cent in 1933. Table sum-
marizes Buffalo's income and expenditures and indicates the
essential points.
Despite a sharp increase in tax delinquency from less than
1per cent in 1930 to 11.5 per cent in 1933, Buffalo's tax
revenue has not been as severely curtailed as that of other
cities of the same size. Adverse financial conditions have not
prevented Buffalo from persistently increasing the amount of
the unused taxing margin. The tax levy decreased much more
rapidly than current expenditures, which increased from $42,-
096,417 in '929—30 to $46,099,830 in 1931—32, and decreased
to in 1932—33. In view of the budgetary deficits in
1931—32 and 1932—33 and the heavy recourse to refunding, it
is likely that Buffalo will have to rely to a greater degree on
the property tax levy as a source of revenue, or else retrench
further.
Although expenditures -forcurrent maintenance declined
from $30,857,794 to $27,183,101 during 1930—33, and although
Buffalo received increasing aid from New York State for educa
tional and general purposes, the heavy demand for welfare
and emergency employment relief was responsibleforthe
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Total current revenue $43,227 $38,865
Borrowings
Funding of notes ... 15,000
Borrowings for improvements 9,873 100
Revenue loans 97' 7,887
Warrants 1,913 1,545
Total income 55,984 63,397
EXPENDITURES
General agencies of government 1,342 1,155
Current maintenance 30,858 27,183
Welfare and emergency employment 1,396 9,821
Debt service 10,056 24,183
CAPITAL OUTLAYS 10,314 1,533
Total expenditures 52,623 62,720
NET RESULTS IN RESL'ECT OF:
Total operations
Net surplus or deficit 3,361 677
Current operations
Current income 43,227 38,865
Current expenditures 42,096 43,515
Net surplus or deficit 1,130 —4,651
Debt service (in percentage form)
Ratio of true debt service to current
expenditure 23.38 14.96
Ratio of complete debt service to total
expenditure 19.10 38.55
Capital outlay
Ratio of capital outlays to total expenditure'9.59 2.44
bonded indebtedness discloses certain interesting facts. There
has been a great increase in welfare relief issues and an almost
complete cessation of borrowing for improvement purposes.
Prior to 1932 relief needs were small enough to be paid from
the general funds of the city. Furthermore, the size of the de-
ficiency issues would tend to indicate deliberate insufficient
budgeting by the city. Until 1929 budget shortages for opera-
tions were met by issues of certificates of indebtedness which440 APPENDIX
were accumulated and funded into bonds. With the adoption
of the new city charter in 1929 this practice was supposedly
eradicated, but, in reality, deficit financing still continued, only
on a smaller scale.
The Federal loan and grant of $1,148,370 will not noticeably
affect the financial status of Buffalo since itis only o.i.i per
cent of the assessed valuation and 1.12 per cent of the gross
debt. The increasing net debt, however, diminished the un-
used borrowing capacity from $36,477,759 in 1930 to $18,876,-
341 in 1933. A further reduction is expected as a consequence
of an estimated decline of $8o,ooo,ooo in the assessed valua-
tions for and the addition of $6,500,000 refunding
issues and the previous accruals of tax sale and improvement
bonds. Owing to its recourse to refunding, the city has not de-
faulted. The inadequate payments of the water division to
the sinking fund has necessitated increased reliance on this
expedient.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA
Atlanta has experienced deficitssince the advent of the
depression. In 1930 the deficit was and it increased
progressively to $1,564,875 in1933. In1932 and 1933 the
shortages were financed by issuing scrip to meet December
salaries and by allowing current bills to remain unpaid. The
threat of restricted bank credit by bankers was responsible
for these measures. As of December 31,1933, scrip was out-
standing in the amount of $1,046,858, and approved vouchers
payable of $180,104.
Current expenditures exceeded current income by $941,260
in 1930 and by $388,242 in 1931. The following year closed
with a current surplus of $100,289, but 1933 ended with a
deficit of $1,567,512. These deficiencies exaggerate the actual
fiscal condition. In no year were capital outlays separated from
current accounts, yet in 1930 outlays totalled $1,450,000.If
this amount could be isolated, the current deficit of that year
would be changed to a surplus of $508,740. Similarly, in 1932,FINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 441
thecurrent surplus of $100,289 included outlays of approxi-
mately $300,000. The current expenditures of 1933 included
vouchers of the previous year totalling $1,409,400. It appears
that in '933 the deficit was a result of liabilities accumulated
from previous years and was financed by the issuance of







(as of December 3!) CHANGE
£930 1931 1932 19331930—33
Income
Total current income $ii,o8i$10,695$9,487$9,028 —19
Total income1 1442713,66611,4809,820 —32
Expenditures
Total current expenditures12,02211,0839,38710,595 —12
Total expenditures2 14,60213,86412,02311,385 —22
Current surplus or deficit —941 —388•+ioo—1,568
Total deficit —175 —198 —1,565
1Includingtrust funds, temporary loans and bond sales, and premiums.
2Includingtrust funds and loans repaid.
During 193o—33 current income declined 19 per cent, while
current expenditures fell only 12 per cent. Expenditures of
1933 were greater than those of 1932inevery category except
the Water Department, whose costsfellslightly, and pay-
ments for debt service, which were reduced by refunding a
$275,000 issue. Yet, even with this general increase, expendi-
tures would not have exceeded income had it not been for
the burden of vouchers accumulated from previousyears
which were paid in1933.Current income,of which the
property tax isthe chief source, declined steadily, but the
decrease was retarded by attemptstotax new sources of
revenue. The items Street Railway Company and Licenses,
Fines, and Fees, which appeared in the income statement, are
testimony of this attempt. In particular,thetotal income
derived from licenses and fees was maintained by increasing442 APPENDIX
some existing charges and adding new ones, such as Moving
Permit Fees, Building Inspectors' Service Charges, and Elec-
trical Inspection Fees.
Assessed valuations rose steadily through 1931whenthe
basis of assessment was 70 per cent. The 1932assessment
dropped io per cent and the basis of assessment was changed
to ioo per cent, thus reducing assessments by a total of 37
per cent. In 1933 the assessment showed a further decline
of ii per cent from the 1932level.This change in base is
especially important since Atlanta islimited to a tax levy
of 15millsand the maximum has been levied in every year
sincei 921.Figuresof tax delinquencies show a rather high
rate at delinquent dates but also indicate that these delin-
quencies are mostly of a temporary nature.
The weight of debt service is apparently not very heavy,
yet Atlanta encountered difficulty in meeting obligations dur-
ing the depression, and in 1933wasforced to refund a ma-
turing issue. The tabulation indicates the steady reduction
in debt service from 1930to1933togetherwith Dun and
Bradstreet estimates for1934and1935. The reduction in
ratio of debt service to current expenditures was accomplished
partly by the refunding of $275,000ofmaturing bonds.
RATIO OF DEBT SERViCE TO







1The amount of service represents the sum actually expended during the year for
principal and interest requirements. The drop between 1932and£933 was due to a
refunding of $275,000 of maturing bonds which Atlanta was unable to redeem from
current income.
2 Dun and Bradstreet estimates.
The funded debt of Atlanta decreased steadily after 1930,
and as of December 31, 1933 totalled $14,881,400.Thegross
debt decreased between 1930and1932,butat the close ofFINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 443
1933 the total was approximately that of 1932 because of a
$1,406,858 issue of scrip which counterbalanced the funded
debt decrease. Temporary borrowing was also drastically re-
duced from a peak of $2,700,000 111 1931 to $775,757 lfl 1933.
The city closed its last fiscal year without any borrowing in
anticipation of taxreceiptsoutstanding. The curtailment of
short-term loans was the direct result of the banks' influence.
Atlanta retained a substantial unused borrowing margin of
1933.
Despitethefactthat Atlanta's indebtednessisrelatively
low, and its debt service not excessive, it will apparently not
be able to assume heavy additional debt for some time to
come. The refunding issue covered exactly the same amount
as the total of Federal loans and grants, $275,000, for police
station improvements.
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA
Durham closed the fiscal year 1932 with a deficit of $26,-
126,andthe fiscal year with a deficit of $36,658. Since no
unfunded debt is outstanding, the recent deficits were prob-
ably financed from accumulated cash reserves. The shortages
of 1932 and i933 are in contrast to the budgetary surpluses
of $4,131 and $85,383 for the fiscal years 1930 and 1931, re-
spectively. In view of the previous surpluses and the size of
the budget, the deficits are not very significant.
Income from the property tax supplied half of Durham's
revenues in 1932 and 1933, and the estimate for 1934 was ap-
proximately the same. Tax collections have experienced a
noticeable decline during the depression but the drop has not
been as severe as in many other cities. Tax delinquency at the
close of the fiscal year increased from 6 per cent in 1930 to
io per cent in 1931, and to 15 per cent in 1932. Total accumu-
lated delinquencies have shown a somewhat similar increase,
yet the total is not extremely large and no taxes for periods
earlier than 1930 are outstanding, indicating that the city has
an efficient collection system and that most of the year-end444 APPENDIX
delinquency is temporary in character. The special assessment
situation is less favorable. As of July1,1933, special assess-
ment liens outstanding totalled $936,521. Of this, $120,648 was
to come due before the end of the year. Moreover, $296,864 of
special levies were also delinquent. The assessments were made
for purposes of street improvement and will be utilized in retiring
outstanding indebtedness incurred to finance the improvements.
The trend of total expenditures has been steadily downward
since 1929; actual expenditures for 1933 were 20.8 per cent
below the 1929 level and the estimated outgo for 1934 is 22.7
per cent lower than in 1929. The greatest decline has been in
general operation, 31 per cent between 1929 and the
estimated reduction for '934 is 69.2 per cent below the 1929
level. Debt service was lower in 1933 than in 1929 by 13.2
per cent, and the estimates for 1934 are 15.9 per cent below
the 1929 debt service costs.
Gross indebtedness has increasedsteadily and markedly:
from $1,306,000in1922to$12,921,146in1929.From1929to
1933thedebt declined to $i1,8o7,000. Under the terms of the
Municipal Finance Act of 1917NorthCarolina cities may
borrow up to 8 per cent of the assessed valuation of property.
Numerous reductions are allowed. On August 7,1933, after
a 13.7 per cent reduction from the previous year in assessed
valuation, Durham still had a total borrowing capacity of
$5,160,000. Of this,$4,479,887 had been used, leaving an
unused borrowing margin of $68o, 113, or 13.18 per cent. In-
cluded in the city's gross debt are $i,8oo,ooo of school bonds
which are only a contingent liability. Although Durham has
pledged itsfull faith and credit to the repayment of these
bonds, they are a direct obligation of the school district, which
is independent of the city.
Although,as mentioned above, the debt servicecost of
Durham has declined during the depression, it is still extraor-
dinarily large, more than half of total expenditures:1932,
59.2per cent; 1933, 58.7 per cent; 1934, 58.1 per cent(esti-
mated). The largest item in the debt service has been the
payment of maturities and interest on assessment bonds. ForFINANCES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 445
1932 and 1933 assessment bond costs were almost half of the
entire debt service charge, 25.6 per cent and 24.2per cent,
respectively. The estimated charge for assessment bonds in
1934 is 22.3 per cent. In view of the high delinquency in as-
sessment taxes, it is not unlikely that there will be defaults in
assessment bonds, unless collections improve. If the most of
bonds of the Water Department (which is self-sustaining) and
the Special Assessments are excluded, the ratio of the total
debt service charges to expenditures is much smaller:1932,
32.9 per cent; '933, 32.8 per cent; 1934, 32.9 per cent(esti-
mated). The to borrowing from the Federal Govern-
ment for public works are clear.